Search 

"Regulating Moral Hazard in Financial Markets" - Launch Conference for the Journal of Financial Regulation 

July 11-12, 2014, Paris

The threat of moral hazard has played an influential role in shaping post-crisis policy debates about the optimal role and limits of financial regulation as a means of constraining socially excessive risk-taking. Simultaneously, however, our understanding of moral hazard - its potential sources, its impact on financial markets and institutions, and the most appropriate regulatory responses - is far from complete. Where does moral hazard reside within the financial system? How does it influence the decisions of market participants, financial regulators, and elected policymakers? How can we identify and measure its impact? What role does financial regulation play in generating it? And, most importantly, what role can regulation play in preventing - or at the very least minimizing - its pernicious effects?

TOPICS: "Regulating Moral Hazard" will seek to enhance our understanding of these and other important questions. More specifically, the conference will seek to explore topics including, but not limited to:
- The sources of moral hazard within the financial system. The 'sources' of moral hazard in this context can be understood as referring to both the location of socially excessive risk-taking (e.g. systemically important financial institutions, the shadow banking system, etc.) as well as its underlying causes (e.g. implicit and explicit state guarantees, the provision of liquidity by central banks, the interdependent relationship between sovereigns and domestic financial services sectors, etc.);
- The relationship between the increasingly integrated structure of the global financial system, the largely fragmented regulatory system which governs it, and the ability of both public and private sector actors to externalize their socially excessive risk-taking;
- Regulatory responses on a global or regional level to constrain the moral hazard of sovereigns - including, for example, the evolving role of the European Central Bank and new Single Supervisory Mechanism/Resolution Mechanisms and their impact on moral hazard in the Eurozone;
- The emerging role of the U.S. Federal Reserve as de facto global lender of last resort and its impact on moral hazard at the global level;
- The role and limits of both conventional regulatory tools (e.g. risk-based supervision and capital requirements) and recent regulatory reforms (e.g. liquidity requirements, bail-in and structural regulation) in constraining moral hazard within financial institutions; and
- The role of constitutional and administrative law, as well as other forms of public sector governance, in generating or constraining moral hazard.

The conference organizers invite papers from scholars, policymakers and practitioners on each of these topics. The organizers encourage the submission of papers which examine these topics from an interdisciplinary, international and/or comparative perspective.

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: All papers should be submitted via email to Genevieve Helleringer at genevieve.helleringer@law.ox.ac.uk. The subject line of the email should state "JFR Inaugural Conference Submission". Authors who wish to have their conference submission considered for the inaugural issue of the JFR should also submit their paper via the ScholarOne link available on the journal's website: jfr.oxfordjournals.org

The deadline for submission of papers for the conference is February 1st, 2014. Authors will be notified regarding whether their paper has been accepted for presentation at the conference by April 1st, 2014.

[ add comment ] permalink ( 3.1 / 134 )

<<First <Back | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | Next> Last>>